On the assumption that we may learn from our elders and betters, this paper approaches some fundamental questions in perceptual epistemology through a dispute between
sceptic-acceptable assumptions for the conclusion that we do know external world propositions. 1 Sceptical arguments come in a number of forms, but the dispute between McDowell and Wright initially turns on an argument with (in Wright's formulation) the following opening premise:
[T]here is no way of justifying particular beliefs about the material world save on the basis of the (inconclusive) evidence given by our senses (Wright 2002: 338) . 2 As an example of such "inconclusive evidence" Wright gives the following:
My experience is in all respects as of a hand held up in front of my face. (336) 3 Because such evidence is "inconclusive" or "defeasible", in the sense that "it is possible to envisage adding to it in such a way that the resulting enlarged body of evidence no longer supports the proposition in question" (333, n. 7), the opening premise implies that "the canonical justification of perceptual claims proceeds through a defeasible inferential base" (346). 4 So a more explicit statement of the first premise is:
1 For one recent attempt to do just that, see Rinard 2011. 2 For comparison, here is McDowell's version of the opening premise (restricted to the visual case), as it appears in an earlier paper: "when I see that things are thus and so, I take it that things are thus and so on the basis of having it look to me as if things are thus and so" (1995: 396). Wright's formulation (but not
McDowell's) might be read as concerning the activity of justifying beliefs about the material world, as opposed to the evidence on which such beliefs are based; it is clear this would be a misreading. 3 There are good questions to be raised about the standard jargon of 'experiences as of an F', 'experiences as if p', and so on. For present purposes we can work with an informal understanding of these expressions.
For vividness "experiences" will be assumed to be conscious, in the sense that excludes blindsighters; nothing will hang on this assumption. 4 'Inference' is usually used for the sorts of transitions between beliefs that occur during theoretical reasoning; talk of 'evidence' suggests inference in this standard sense, and Wright will be interpreted accordingly. Some authors count transitions from experiences to beliefs as inferences-that broader usage is not followed here. Whether perception involves an inference in the narrow sense of this paper is taken up at length later (section 5).
Our external world beliefs are (only) justified by inference from inconclusive evidence, including evidence that we are having experiences as if such-and-such. 5 For compactness and ease of comparison with alternatives to come, this will be shortened to:
P1
Our external world beliefs are justified by evidence that we are having experiences as if such-and-such.
The remainder of the argument purports to show that the inconclusive evidence of the Three main ways of resisting the argument may be crudely summarized as follows. According to explanationism, given enough sensory evidence that coheres together in the right way, one may know that here is a hand on the basis of an "inference to the best explanation". According to apriorism, additional pieces of non-sensory evidence are (somehow) available, for example, that one's senses are generally reliable -the contemporary equivalent of Descartes' claim that God is not a deceiver. The evidence of the senses taken together with this additional non-sensory evidence allows one to know that here is a hand. And according to dogmatism, evidence that one's "experience is in all respects as of a hand…" can allow one to know that here is a hand 5 This should be interpreted as requiring only that inferences from inconclusive evidence figure in the (perhaps distant) aetiology of any justified external world belief. So, for instance, being justified in believing P while having forgotten the evidence on which P was based is not a counterexample. 6 The remainder of the argument might attempt to show that sensory evidence does not support external world propositions over various sceptical hypotheses; alternatively, it might attempt to show that sensory evidence fails to support the negation of sceptical hypotheses. The latter strategy requires closure, but the former doesn't-see Cohen 1998 for discussion. Although Wright himself does not deny closure, the sceptical argument he develops in his 2002 does not require it. (A closure principle is used in the sceptical argument set out in the appendix to Wright 2008.) without assistance from collateral evidence about the reliability of one's senses or anything else. 7 Not surprisingly each of these three positions faces a variety of objections. For the purposes of assessing the Wright-McDowell debate, the details of these positions won't matter, since it turns out that P1 is the crux.
McDowell's diagnosis, Wright's reply, and so on
McDowell's diagnosis of the sceptic's mistake is expressed in these passages:
The diagnosis is that this scepticism expresses an inability to make sense of the idea of direct perceptual access to objective facts about the environment. What shapes this scepticism is the thought that even in the best possible case, the most that perceptual experience can yield falls short of a subject's having an environmental state of affairs directly available to her. Consider situations in which a subject seems to see that, say, there is a red cube in front of her. The idea is that even if we focus on the best possible case, her experience could be just as it is, in all respects, even if there were no red cube in front of her. This seems to reveal that perceptual experience provides at best inconclusive warrants for claims about the environment. And that seems incompatible with supposing we ever, strictly speaking, know anything about our objective surroundings. ( Russell 1912 /1997 : 22-4, Jackson 1977 : 141-7, Vogel 1990 , BonJour 2003 . Apriorism: Wright 2004 , White 2006 . Dogmatism: Pollock 1974 : ch. 5, Pryor 2000 , Burge 2003 . N.B. the official positions of the authors just cited typically depart in minor (and sometimes major)
ways from the rough sketch of the three positions in the text. For example, most of the cited authors are primarily concerned with justification, not knowledge, and many would also deny P1 (see section 6 below).
Apriorism and Dogmatism are sometimes labeled Conservativism and Liberalism (Silins 2008 According to McDowell, the sceptic has overlooked the possibility that we have "direct perceptual access" to environmental facts. And if we do have such access, then P1 is false: the warrant that perceptual experience provides is not "inconclusive". Can't the sceptic just grant the possibility of "direct perceptual access" and deny its actuality?
Indeed, but this is toothless unless backed by an argument. The sceptic bears the onus of proof-if she can't supply a reason why we do not in fact have "direct perceptual access", and if this is the most plausible way of explaining our perceptual knowledge, then we may fairly take ourselves to have such access.
Wright does not question, at any rate for the sake of the argument, that we in fact have "direct perceptual access". Instead, he replies that the move from "direct perceptual access" to the denial of P1 is illegitimate:
In brief: whether our perceptual faculties engage the material world directly is one issue and whether the canonical justification of perceptual claims proceeds through a defeasible inferential base is another. One is, so far, at liberty to take a positive view of both issues. (Wright 2002: 346) 8 According McDowell responds by insisting, in effect, that the disjunctive conception of experience is incompatible with P1:
The point of the disjunctive conception is that if one undergoes an experience that belongs on the 'good' side of the disjunction, that warrants one in believingindeed presents one with an opportunity to know-that things are as the experience reveals them as being. When one's perceptual faculties "engage the material world directly", as Wright puts it, the result-a case of having an environmental state of affairs directly present to one in experience-constitutes one's being justified in making the associated perceptual claim. It is hard to see how any other kind of justification could have a stronger claim to the title 'canonical'. And this justification is not defeasible. If someone sees that P, it cannot fail to be the case that P. So if one accepts the disjunctive conception, one
is not at liberty to go on supposing that "the canonical justification of perceptual claims proceeds through a defeasible inferential base". (McDowell 2008: 378) To which Wright replies that McDowell fails to address the earlier point, that "there is an evident gap between direct awareness of a situation in virtue of which P is true and the acquisition of warrant for the belief that P" (Wright 2008: 398) . He illustrates the independence (as he sees it) between "direct awareness" and having any warrant at all, let alone a "conclusive" one, with the following familiar example: To sum up the state of play at half-time. The sceptic propounds an argument with the following premise:
P1
McDowell claims that P1 is false because sometimes we have "direct perceptual access" to environmental facts, which supposedly entails that our senses do not (solely) supply "inconclusive" evidence. Wright counters by arguing that the entailment does not go through: direct perceptual access is compatible with inconclusive sensory evidence.
Clearly the resolution of this dispute is going to turn on what "direct perceptual access" amounts to. For assistance, let us turn to its historical antecedents.
"Direct perceptual access"
The two main conceptions of perceptual "directness" or "immediacy'" are both found in the first of Berkeley's Dialogues:
in truth the senses perceive nothing which they do not perceive immediately: for they make no inferences... sensible things are those only which are immediately perceived by sense. (Berkeley 1734 (Berkeley /1994 The first sentence suggests the following definition:
INFERENTIAL IMMEDIACY: one immediately (directly) perceives that p iff one noninferentially knows that p by perception.
On this inferential conception of immediacy, the items that are "directly" or "immediately" perceived are not objects, for example ordinary physical objects like hands or barns, but facts, for example that the barn is red. Another fact about this very barn might be indirectly perceived on the same occasion by the same subject: that it needs repainting, for instance. This illustrates why, on the inferential conception, no clear useful sense attaches to speaking of an object like a barn being perceived directly.
In contrast, the second sentence (together with some of Berkeley's examples)
suggests a conception of immediacy on which the items that are "directly" perceived are physical objects like barns or hay bales.
OBJECT IMMEDIACY: one immediately (directly) perceives o iff __________
The blank signals the fact that the intended contrast between "directly" perceiving a barn and "indirectly" perceiving it is quite obscure, a point well made by Austin (1962 Inference-DPA: we are in a position to non-inferentially know external world propositions by perception.
And, second:
Object-DPA: we perceive material objects (e.g. barns) "directly".
11 Disentangling the two sorts of immediacy took some work: see Armstrong 1976 , and also Jackson 1977:
6-11. Armstrong also highlights the importance of the quoted passages from Berkeley. Now what is DPA, the thesis urged on us by McDowell? From section 2 it should be fairly clear that, according to Wright, DPA is object-DPA. Wright's example of the barn is supposed to be a case of "direct perception", but it is obviously not a case of being in a position to non-inferentially know that there is a barn there, because it is not a case of Perhaps the most persuasive is that McDowell is quite careful never to talk of "direct perceptual access" to objects like barns-the items to which we enjoy such access are always facts. 13 , 14
Still, there is no doubt that one way of motivating scepticism is fueled by the denial of object-DPA; a brief detour to examine this further will not go amiss.
Scepticism and the "Lockean conception"
The classic metaphor that encapsulates the epistemological problem with indirect realism is of course the "veil of perception" (Bennett 1971: 69) Ironically, the quotation from Locke shows why the main problem with indirect realism is not epistemological. The distinction between "direct" and "indirect" object perception is not explicitly in Locke, and the quotation imputes to Malebranche the view that objects like horses are not perceived, rather than being perceived "indirectly". 16 If the indirect realist can do no better than this, then scepticism is the least of her worries. The defects of a theory that holds that we do not see horses or barns are not best brought out by claiming that the theory makes knowledge of horses and barns impossible to attain.
14 Another reason is that the terminology of "access" suggests something epistemological. And yet another is simple charity: better an enlightened McDowell than a muddled one. On the alternative "inferential" interpretation, to be developed below, McDowell has some genuine insights.
Supposing the epistemological problem to be somehow solved, there is still the stubborn fact that we do actually see horses and barns, on occasion.
This problem can be illustrated by a well-known passage of Moore's, in which he
attempts to explain what he means by 'sense-data' by inviting the reader "to look at his own right hand":
If he does this he will be able to pick out something...with regard to which he will see that...it is a natural view to take that that thing is identical, not, indeed, with his whole right hand, but with that part of his surface which he is actually seeing, but will also (on a little reflection) be able to see that it is doubtful whether it can be identical with the part of the surface of his hand in question. Things of the sort …are what I mean by 'sense-data '. (1959: 54) Ecumenically defined in this fashion, sense-data could turn out to be identical to parts of the surfaces of material objects, and indeed that is one of the options Moore goes on later to consider. But he also considers two other options, one of which is indirect realism: the sense-datum to which Moore directs the reader's attention is "not…itself part of the surface of a human hand" (55). Suppose that this second option is right: the object that one might naively have taken to be part of the surface of one's right hand is in fact not part of its surface-moreover, it is not a physical object at all. Once one arrives at this position, it is hard to imagine how one could nonetheless see part of the surface of one's hand. This is just an instance of a standard procedure we employ to conclude that we don't see such-and-such: visually attend to the best candidate for being such-and-such, and convince yourself that it is not in fact such-and-such.
It does not help to insist that the presence of the sense-datum is caused by the presence of the hand, because seeing a manifestation or effect of X is not sufficient for seeing X. Seeing a vapor trail in a "Wilson cloud-chamber" (an example from Austin 1962: 18) is not a way of ("indirectly") seeing an alpha particle-they are far too small to see. A temptation to think otherwise derives from conflating the object and inferential versions of indirect perception, because the cloud-chamber is a case of the latter-"we see something from which the existence (or occurrence) of something else can be inferred " (1962: 17) .
Although this objection to indirect realism is floating on the surface of Moore's text, he does not pursue it, raising instead the usual epistemological worry about "how we can possibly know" anything about the alleged item of which "this sense-datum is an appearance or manifestation" (1959: 57).
Bennett's "veil of perception" metaphor, then, is even better than he might have hoped. A veil is not necessarily a veil of ignorance-one might have all sorts of clues as to what lies behind it. But the whole point of a veil is to prevent anyone from seeing what lies behind it. The Lockean conception arguably prevents us from knowing that we have hands; the case that it prevents us from seeing our hands is even more compelling.
If scepticism is to be anything more than a shallow confusion, its appeal should not be traced to the Lockean conception. Fortunately McDowell does not make that mistake.
P1 and inference-DPA
With the Lockean conception firmly out of the way, let us return to Wright's sceptical argument, and McDowell's claim that we enjoy "direct perceptual access" to environmental facts, or DPA.
Recall the first premise of the sceptical argument:
P1
A sensible (non-Lockean) sceptic will concede that the "good case" (a situation in which the subject's eyes are working perfectly, her hand is held up in front of her face in broad daylight, etc.) is entirely devoid of sense-data, or anything else that might be "draped between the subject and the external world". According to the sensible sceptic, in the good case the subject sees her hand, and is able to refer demonstratively to it ('That is a hand', and the like). But, the sceptic will maintain, these concessions are not in conflict with P1. And once P1 is secured, the sceptic goes on to argue that in the good case the subject's sensory evidence is not strong enough to support knowledge that she has hands.
Section 3 set out the evidence that McDowell's DPA is (to a first approximation)
inference-DPA:
Inference-DPA: we are in a position to non-inferentially know external world propositions by perception.
And inference-DPA is incompatible with P1, since that premise (on its intended reading)
implies that we are only in a position to inferentially know facts about the external world, specifically by inference from sensory evidence, for instance that "my experience is in all respects as of a hand held up in front of my face". 17 Thus, pace Wright (2008: 395) ,
McDowell does not dismiss scepticism by loftily refusing to take it seriously: he directly engages the sceptic's case, finding fault at the very first step.
Of course, denying a premise of the sceptical argument on the grounds that DPA is true is all very well, but some argument for DPA must be given. McDowell offers a transcendental argument, which he summarizes as follows:
The argument aims to establish that the idea of environmental facts making themselves available to us in perception must be intelligible, because that is a necessary condition for it to be intelligible that experience has a characteristic that is, for purposes of this argument, not in doubt.
The relevant characteristic is that experience purports to be of objective reality. When one undergoes perceptual experience, it at least appears to one as if things in one's environment are a certain way. (2008: 380) According to McDowell, if experience purports to be of objective reality, then it follows that DPA is possibly true. And since (we may assume) the sceptic has no objection to the claim that DPA is actually true if it is possibly true, if the transcendental argument succeeds the sceptic's game is up. Now, in line with McDowell's sage assessment of the dialectic mentioned at the start of this paper, the transcendental argument does not attempt to "prove that we are not, say, at the mercy of Descartes's demon…without begging questions against someone who urges sceptical doubts". However, it comes uncomfortably close. The sensible 17 Of course, since DPA implies that we are in a position to know external world propositions, and everyone will concede that if we are in a position to know then we do know, DPA is also incompatible with the conclusion of the sceptical argument. So the sceptic will not be impressed, but that is no objection-see below.
sceptic will concede that experience does purport to be of objective reality, so if the transcendental argument succeeds by her own lights the sceptic will be forced to withdraw her assertion of P1. Admittedly, she will not be forced to assert not-P1, agree that DPA is actually true, or agree that she has a hand, but if we can show the sceptic without "begging questions" that she has no reason to endorse P1 that is already impressive enough.
McDowell is in danger of not taking his own advice on how best to answer scepticism. It would certainly be interesting if we could undercut one of the sceptic's premises by her own lights. But we should not be trying to do anything by the sceptic's own lights-we should simply be trying to diagnose the flaw in the sceptical argument. Many three-year-old children, for instance, despite having copious amounts of perceptual knowledge, show little or no understanding of the distinction between veridical and illusory perception (Flavell 1986) . 19 And without beliefs about perceptual appearances, 18 Of course this point is not new. For instance: "There is nothing odd in the hypothesis of beings which are aware of objects, but not of their own awareness; it is, indeed, highly probable that young children and the higher animals are such beings" (Russell 1921 (Russell /1995 . More recently it has been emphasized by Burge (2003) . 19 Chimps might do better than children in this respect (Krachun et al. 2009 probably no exaggeration to say that the kind of human knowledge that is best understood is perceptual (in particular visual) knowledge: knowledge of mathematics, of the unobserved, of one's own mind, and so on, remaining quite poorly understood. And although computational theories of vision lean heavily on something like "subpersonal inference", they have no place at all for any inference from premises about experiences.
20 It might be replied that these issues about the psychological reality of inferences are irrelevant to P1, properly interpreted:
The other main ground for rejecting the assumption ["of justifying an inference based on senseexperience or 'the evidence of our senses'" (Jackson 1977: 151) ] has been that, as a matter of evident psychological fact, we don't usually form beliefs about how things look and feel and then form beliefs about how they are…It seems to me, however, to carry little epistemological weight.
What is at issue is how we justify our perceptual beliefs, not how we arrive at them… (Jackson 1977: 152) (Cf. McDowell 2011: 25-6.) However, the issue here is not primarily how we could justify our perceptual beliefs, but rather how they are justified, whether or not we bother to engage in the activity of justifying them. And this means that the genesis of our perceptual beliefs cannot be ignored. Suppose when challenged I justify my belief in P by citing evidence E that in fact supports P; that does not show that my belief in P was justified: perhaps it was not formed on the basis of E, but was instead a lucky guess. (See also note 2 above.) Naturally none of this will impress the sceptic, since she will view any empirical claims about the external world as "begging questions", but this is irrelevant since we are not trying to impress the sceptic. What's more, none of this will impress McDowell, who thinks there is an important distinction between perceptual knowledge enjoyed by selfaware language-using humans and that enjoyed by those who are not at home in the "space of reasons", such as bonobos and small children. 21 But we are not trying to impress McDowell either.
Despite the weight of tradition, P1 is really not very credible, and no sophisticated transcendental argument is needed to show this. Does this mean that Wright's sceptic should pack up and go home? Not yet.
A subtler sceptical argument
In fact, P1 has been under a cloud for some time. …giving a special account of the knowledge of rational animals is consistent with regarding perceptual knowledge in rational animals as a sophisticated species of a genus that is also instantiated more primitively in non-rational animals and pre-rational human children…If our concern is with species, we do not have to restrict ourselves to things that are true of all instances of the genus of which it is a species. (2011: 20-1)
The problem is that this completely fails to counter the complaint in its most powerful form. McDowell rightly says one might give quite different accounts of how two sorts of animals, S and S´, have feature F.
For instance, the accounts of how S and S´ are camouflaged might be different: S has the mottled coloring of bark, while S´ has the solid coloring of leaves. (Perhaps bark-camouflage is a "sophisticated species" of the genus camouflage "that is also instantiated more primitively" in animal S´.) But in the case at hand the account of why one animal has feature F also appears to apply to the other. On the alternative Burgean view, on which one's justification is inconclusive, some bad cases are like the predicament of an unlucky detective-at least as characterized by orthodoxy about justification. In the "good case", the detective knows that OJ is the murderer on the basis of compelling evidence: motive, opportunity, bloodstained clothing, etc. In the "bad case", the unlucky detective's evidence is misleading: OJ was framed. Still, in the bad case (as orthodoxy has it) the detective's belief is justified exactly as it is in the good case.
A better approximation to McDowell's DPA, then, is the conjunction of P1´ marks a curious turn in epistemology, which may be traced to the influential chapter 3 of Pollock's Knowledge and Justification. In that chapter Pollock, after despatching alternative positions, arrives at the conclusion that:
…statements about the way things appear to us constitute prima facie reasons for judgements about how they are. For example, "I am appeared to redly" constitutes a prima facie reason for me to believe that there is something red before me. (Pollock 1974: 57) 26 So, if someone realizes that she is being "appeared to redly" and thereby concludes that there is something red before her, then (absent any reason for thinking otherwise) her belief is justified. Pollock then notes an immediate problem:
[I]t is simply false that in making perceptual judgments we generally have any beliefs at all about the way things appear to us… (57; see also the quotation in the previous section).
According to Pollock, the "above difficulty" has a simple solution:
Rather than say that it is my thinking that I am appeared to redly which justifies me in thinking that there is something red before me, why not simply say that it is my being appeared to redly that constitutes the prima facie reason? (59) Pollock is in effect suggesting:
1. If one justifiably believes that p by inference from the evidence that one has an experience as if p, then a suitable non-inferential causal connection between the experience and the belief would also yield an equally-well justified belief that p.
(1) is an instance of a more general claim:
2. If one justifiably believes that p by inference from (causally efficacious) evidence E, then a suitable non-inferential causal connection between E and the belief would also yield an equally-well justified belief that p.
Pollock defends (a close enough approximation to) (2) on the basis of examples such as the following. I believe that my dog is ill because he has a glazed look in his eye. "[M]y reason for thinking he is ill is that he has a glazed look in his eye, but as I did not consciously note the latter, I did not have the belief that he has a glazed look in his eye" The efficacy of this restriction is debatable, but the main problem lies elsewhere.
Pollock has given no reason why the "ordinary psychological causes" at work in the example of the dog do not include the belief (or knowledge) that the dog has a glazed look in his eye. All he says is that "on a conscious level I was previously unaware of the glazed look", which would seem to make room for the idea that he was aware of the glazed look (that is, did notice that the dog had a glazed look in his eye), albeit not "on a conscious level". Pollock seems to be relying on an overly restricted conception of belief:
if "I cannot even articulate the implicit reason" (64) for believing such-and-such, or if the "implicit reason" was not "on a conscious level", then I did not believe the implicit reason.
Further, none of Pollock's examples is of any help in showing how small children or animals who lack beliefs about experiences might nonetheless come to know about their environment. 28 As Pollock himself notes, one element that is common to his examples is that "the circumstances…were such that I could have justifiably believed
[E]" (61). Since recognizing that a dog has a glazed look might well not be beyond the capacity of children (or dogs, come to that), consider another of Pollock's examples. "I may believe that A dislikes B. I may be…quite right, and yet be unable to cite any particular reason for believing it" (60). Suppose my reason consists in certain "behavioral cues" (61) which specifically concern linguistic behavior-subtle verbal put-downs, and so forth. No one would expect a pre-linguistic child to be able to know that A dislikes B on this basis.
At least going by Pollock's discussion, (2) is remarkably ill-motivated. Since P1´ rests on (2), that premise is also unsupported. What's more, it faces a serious objection.
Remember that the sensible sceptic concedes that in the good case one is able to refer demonstratively to objects like hands, and to think singular thoughts about them ('That hand is large', and the like). If perception allows one to know that there are hands, it allows one to know that here is this hand. Indeed, it is natural to think that the singular case is primary: at least typically, one knows that there are hands because this is a trivial consequence of something else one knows, namely that here is this hand. According to P1´, my belief that here is this hand is justified to the extent it would be if I had inferred it from evidence about my experiences, for instance that "my experience is in all respects as of a hand held up in front of my face". The sceptic assumes that such evidence, including any supplementary premises that I might appeal to (for instance about the reliability of sense perception), is entirely general, at least with respect to material objects like hands. that h has five fingers, but that this is not a strange asymmetry because it also justifies me in believing similar propositions about all objects distinct from h: h´, h´´,… Although I am justified in believing these propositions (I have "propositional" justification for them), for numerous such objects x I will not even grasp the proposition that x has five fingers; the justification I have for believing in these propositions I cannot grasp is therefore idle. Alternatively, one might deny that I am justified in believing the proposition that h has five fingers, trading it in for some surrogate that I am supposedly justified in believing, for instance the proposition that the object that is (actually) causing me to have an experience as of a five-fingered hand has five fingers (cf. Searle 1983: 47-8) ; among other problems, this suggestion apparently leaves animals and small children by the wayside, since they presumably do not entertain thoughts about the causation of experiences.
DPA revisited
DPA, recall, is the conjunction of:
And:
Conclusive-justification: Our justification for (some) external world beliefs is conclusive.
An argument for the first conjunct has in effect already been presented, in section 5. If small children and other animals are in a position to have non-inferential perceptual knowledge, so are we. What about the second conjunct?
Consider a situation in which one sees a moving ball and thereby comes to know that this ball is moving; granted that knowledge entails justification, one is justified in believing that this ball is moving. For simplicity suppose one has never seen the ball before and has no prior beliefs about it. We may suppose that, according to Conclusivejustification, this good case is such that one is not justified in any corresponding bad case.
Consider, then, a corresponding bad case, in which the ball is not moving but just appears that way, exactly as it does in the good case. Is one justified in this bad case? To judge by the diverse answers to this question in the literature, the issue is not at all clear.
Some of an internalist bent say that merely having the experience is sufficient for justification. Those with more externalist sympathies say that further conditions must obtain: that one's belief is the result of a reliable process, or something along related there would be no explanation of how one is justified in believing a singular proposition concerning this particular ball. Whatever experience does the explaining, it must be an "object-dependent" experience, the having of which requires the existence of this particular ball, but does not require that this ball be moving. The obvious candidate is this: an experience as if this ball is moving, or, in more colloquial terms, this ball's looking (or appearing) to be moving to one. Generalized, the suggestion is: P1´´: Our external world beliefs are justified by having experiences that are sometimes object-dependent, for instance experiences as if x is so-and-so.
('Justified by having' should be interpreted as in P1´-see section 6. P1´´ should be read, like P1 and P1´, as compatible with versions of dogmatism, apriorism, and explanationism.)
Although McDowell rejects P1´´, in reaching it we have already moved some considerable distance towards his own position. According to the earlier two premises P1
and P1´, the epistemically relevant kinds of experiences are those that do not entail the existence of particular objects. With the common assumption that a brain in a vat enjoys the full range of experiences of this general sort, these two premises imply that a brain in a vat is justified in believing that he has hands, like his unvatted counterpart. In holding Conclusive-justification, McDowell denies this conclusion, as does a proponent of P1´´:
brains in vats lack object-dependent experiences, hence are not justified in believing singular propositions.
Return to the example of the ball. One believes that this ball is moving as a causal upshot of how the ball looks, although this is not the result of an inference. According to P1´´, one's belief is justified as if one had inferred it from the evidence that this ball looks or appears to be moving. But what is it for one to "have evidence" that this ball appears to be moving? There is no accepted answer to that question. In order to give the defender of P1´´ the maximum amount of rope, let us assume that to have E in one's body of evidence is to be in an exemplary epistemic position with respect to E, specifically to know E. (Thus for the sake of the argument we are temporarily assuming half of Williamson's "E=K" thesis (2000: ch. 9) : if E is part of one's evidence then one knows E.) One's belief that this ball is moving is then justified to the extent it would have been had one inferred it from the known premise that this ball looks (to one) to be moving.
Now consider a third-person version of the example of the ball. One learns (hence knows) that this ball looks to be moving to some animal. Suppose that one doesn't know anything about the veridicality of motion perception. Is the fact that the ball looks to be moving to some animal good evidence for the proposition that this ball is moving? Surely not. (Neither is it good evidence for the weaker proposition that a ball is moving.) To believe that this ball is moving on such a slender basis would be to take a stab in the dark.
The situation would be somewhat improved if one knew a priori (perhaps on Davidsonian charity-based grounds) that "most perceptions are veridical"-but not improved enough. The extra knowledge might make it likely that the ball was moving, but it would be going beyond the evidence to flatly believe that it is.
Would it help to multiply the evidence concerning how things appear to a particular animal? Suppose one additionally learns that before this ball looked to be moving, a cube looked to be stationary, and then looked to be hit by another ball, and so forth. Perhaps one could know the general shape of the animal's environment-that it contains moving bodies, and the like-by an inference to the best explanation of this evidence. Perhaps the hypothesis that this ball is moving is even a plausible hypothesis, but the possibility that the animal's perceptual system was malfunctioning on this occasion can hardly be ruled out. (Note that in order for this third-person example to be a good parallel for the perceptual case, background evidence should be kept to a minimum.
One does not have evidence that directly concerns the workings of the animal, nor for that matter does one know anything science might deliver about the nature of its environment.)
What if the two previous strategies-apriorism and explanationism-were combined? Arguably that still doesn't secure knowledge that this ball is moving. An analogy: one knows that an ancient text is a largely accurate report of a riot in a marketplace in Samarra. No matter how coherent the text, one's evidence does not allow one to know specific details, for instance that a basket of dates was overturned, or that
Hasan's eggs were stolen.
This complaint against the combined strategy is not decisive, at least not without a more lengthy discussion. But apriorism and explanationism face more serious difficulties.
Recall the objection to P1 in section 5, that it did not make room for the perceptual knowledge of languageless animals and small children. On the dogmatist view, the solution to this problem is to switch to a non-inferential transition between the experience and the corresponding belief. This can seem harmless, because it is not obviously objectionable to suppose that a non-inferential transition between an experience as if p and the belief that p takes place in animals and children. But on apriorism and explanationism, there are further inferences to be dispensed with-either from nonsensory evidence or from other sensory evidence concerning one's past experiences. It is not credible to suppose that the necessary non-inferential transitions take place in animals and children. Hence once the inferential picture has been dispatched, apriorism and explanationism have too.
So far, we have been considering a third-person variant of the example of the ball:
one knows that this ball looks to be moving to some animal. The first-person case is of course the one that is of primary interest. But what difference does it make if the animal in question is known to be oneself? None: egocentrism is no more plausible in epistemology than elsewhere.
The upshot is this. P1´´ makes partial scepticism hard to resist: we may know something about the external world, but many particular facts-that this ball is moving, 
